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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the channels through which macroeconomic and institutional instability prevents or 
hinders innovative investment undertakings financed by the domestic private sector. The analysis is based on a 
sample of 44 countries representing all levels of development and considers a number of instability 
dimensions. The results suggest a negative impact of real, monetary and political instability on the aggregate 
level of national R&D financed by the business sector. Thus, they highlight the desirability of stable macro-
institutional environments in preventing avoidance or abandonment of private innovation undertakings. 
Keywords: Macroeconomic Volatility, Political Instability, Private R&D Investment, Innovation. 
JEL Classification: C33, O11, O31, O33 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of private innovation for growth is widely studied and recognised in the economic 
growth literature (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1993). However, pronounced disparities 
persist in the shares of private R&D investment across countries. Figure 1 below may help gauge the 
extent of the cross-country disparity existing in private sectors’ R&D engagement, within the panel 
of economies used in this study. A number of structural factors have been investigated at length and 
proposed by the literature to explain the variation in countries’ levels of private R&D spending. 
                                            
1 I am grateful to Kyriakos Neanidis, Edmund Amann, David Chivers, participants to the 16th ICMAIF and to the 
Manchester University Development Economics Seminar (2012) for helpful discussion and comments. I bear sole 
responsibility, however, for the views expressed here.   
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Figure 1. Business R&D (%GDP) 
 
The values represent the ratio of Business Funded R&D to GDP, and they are calculated as a national average over the time span 1994-2008 (Raw data 
is from the OECD, Main Science&Technology Database, UNESCO UIS and RICYT.org)
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This paper seeks to analyse such issue by focusing specifically on the impact that macroeconomic 
and political instability has on the level of aggregate private innovative investment. The reason for 
considering such perspective is related to the inherently high risk content of R&D investment, 
which is due to both its longer than average maturity horizon and to its high budget requirements 
(Katz, 1987). Based on these elements, it seemed plausible to hypothesise that firms’ plans to spend 
on costly and risky innovative projects may be subject to revision in uncertain environments and 
that, as a result, aggregate private innovation spending may remain low or decline. Such hypothesis 
is supported by the findings of the empirical analysis presented in what follows, for the country 
panel considered.  
 
This has been shown to be the result of firms’ abandonment or avoidance of innovative investment 
undertakings by  a number of microeconomic studies (Rafferty, 2003; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; 
Aghion et al, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al, 2009, Aghion et al, 2010). The key contribution of this 
literature lies in the evidence provided to establish the existence of a cash-flow effect, which 
financially constrains firms and hinders the undertaking of innovative investment during 
downturns. Following the Schumpeterian analysis of the business cycle and Hall’s reorganizational 
capital theory (1991), Saint-Paul (1993) had argued against such ‘cash-flow’ effect. He maintained 
that during recessions the opportunity cost faced by innovating firms in terms of foregone profits is 
lower as the value of expected sales decreases. This will provide an incentive for firms to allocate 
resources to R&D during recessionary phases.  
 
Subsequently, however, Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) revised this hypothesis and proved that it 
only holds as long as innovation costs are not so high as to represent a financial constraint. Along 
the same line of argument, Aghion et al. (2008) and Rafferty and Funk (2008) have shown that the 
existence of an asymmetry in binding constraints causes cash-flow effects to bind more during 
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recessions than expansions. The result is that during recessions firms disinvest more than what they 
invest during expansions. Likewise, the ‘opportunity-cost’ effect is shown to bind more during 
booms than slumps. As a result, firms tend to relocate resources away from R&D and towards sales 
when positive demand shocks occur, but the opposite is unlikely to happen to the same extent 
during negative demand shocks.  In addition, Bohva-Padilla et al. (2009) show that counter-
cyclicality in R&D spending is more likely in small and medium-sized firms, which tend to 
experience binding credit constraints the most; whereas, pro-cyclicality is more likely for non-
credit constrained firms, such as MNCs or subsidised firms. 
 
This paper represents a contribution to the existing literature on volatility and innovation in a few 
respects. Firstly, the literature described above concentrates on the first moment of the business 
cycle and in particular on the relationship between uncertainty surrounding recession expectations 
and firms’ innovative behavior. This study, instead, extends the focus to the second moment of 
aggregate economies’ fluctuations, that is, to overall volatility. Secondly, all the previously cited 
studies take up a microeconometric empirical approach and use firm-level data, most often on 
OECD-based firms only. This is typically due to the scarcity of developing countries’ aggregate 
data on innovation (Goel and Ram, 1999; Aghion et al., 2010; Agénor and Neanidis, 2011). The 
present study adopts, instead, a macroeconometric approach and analyses cross-country variations 
in the level of national private R&D. This is done in an attempt to uncover aggregate response 
patterns to macro-institutional instability which go beyond individual productive sectors’ reactions.  
 
A final contribution is represented by the estimation of separate impacts for various sub-
components forming aggregate volatility. This allows to disentangle a number of contemporaneous 
yet different dimensions co-existing in unstable macro-institutional environments. Specifically, my 
econometric findings suggest three ways in which instability negatively affects business R&D 
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spending, that is, political, real and monetary volatility. Such impacts will be shown to exhibit non-
linearities and to be larger for higher values of the real and monetary volatility dimensions. In 
addition, the negative effect of monetary instability appears to be mitigated during expansionary 
phases of the cycle, in the sample considered. Finally, the evidence surrounding both financial and 
international volatility is inconclusive. The remaining of the paper is structured in this way: the 
following section describes the model and the data used in the empirical analysis. The results, 
along with the sensitivity analysis, are presented in section 3 and 4. Section 5 summarise the main 
findings and concludes. Finally, all data sources, the list of countries included in my sample and 
some methodological considerations appear in Appendix A and B. 
 
2. DATA AND MODEL 
 
The panel used for this analysis covers 15 years, from 1994 to 2008, while the baseline sample 
includes 956 observations. Due to missing data, however, the actual estimated panel size is reduced 
to 44 countries and 281 observations. Unfortunately, as it has been mentioned above, the 
limitations of aggregate innovation data is its scarcity.
 2
 Sub-Saharan African countries, for 
example, with the exclusion of Uganda and South Africa, do not publish secondary data on 
innovation. Therefore, the panel suffers from an underrepresentation of African countries that 
                                            
2 To maximize the amount of data on public and private R&D in the dataset, a number of databases have been merged 
which report measures of business and government R&D for different countries (see Appendix A). Prior to this, lack of 
correspondence in measurement units as well as data discrepancies proved to be an issue. This has been overcome by 
rebasing all observations in the currency denomination year of the database containing the biggest portion of usable data. 
The unit of measurement has been homogenized across the various sources and million dollars have been used as the base 
unit. Finally, in a number of occasions, variables which were identically defined across the datasets differed in practice in 
the information and/or data used in their construction. Where such data discrepancies were encountered, appropriate 
transformations were used to restore comparability. 
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needs to be acknowledged. The choice of regressors included in the model specification has taken 
into account and sought comparison with a variety of stability/instability indicators used in the 
literature, and it includes various control variables which have been used by the literature on the 
determinants of innovative investment. The benchmark econometric specification is as follows: 
  
( )                      ∑        ∑         ∑           
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
where the dependent variable, yit, is BusinessR&D: the share of investment in R&D financed by the 
domestic business sector, calculated as a % of GDP. The right hand side of the regression includes 
three variable vectors, alongside a vector of time-invariant country fixed effects, αi.
3
 The set 
          
  and           
  contain, respectively, endogenous and exogenous control variables 
commonly used in the literature surrounding the determinants of R&D investment.  
 
Specifically, the following variables enter           
 : GDP per capita (in log-form) controls for the 
overall level of development of the countries in the panel. 
4
 To capture a potential non-linearity in 
the relationship between level of development and private innovative spending, an interaction of 
GDP per capita with a dummy variable (HI) has also been included. The dummy takes the value of 
1 for countries classified as middle to high income economies by the World Bank’s Atlas 
                                            
3 A vector of time-varying common effects is also included in the benchmark specification (column 11 of Table 1) but 
none enters the regressions significantly, therefore time dummies are dropped from all subsequent estimations 
4 The relevance of human capital and educational levels for the innovation process has been highlighted by both theory 
(Lucas, 1988; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001) and empirics (Wang, 2010). The reason 
why such variable is excluded from this analysis is because of its very high correlation with GDP. 
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classification system and zero otherwise.
5
  The share of publicly financed R&D is used to capture 
the role of public investment tangible and intangible infrastructure, which may have a 
complementary or crowding out effect on private innovative investment (see David et al., 2000, for 
a review of the contrasting literature on this). Finally, this vector also contains a measure of trade 
openness calculated as the sum of exports and imports to GDP. Trade openness has been used by 
the literature (Smolny, 2003; Sameti et al., 2010) to capture the contribution that international 
exchange is likely to have on the ease and pace of innovation and technological progress.  
      
The real interest rate appears among the exogenous control set           
 , alongside, a measure of 
stock market capitalization. The latter has been used in a number of studies to proxy for financial 
development; but it also captures the effect of higher levels of both credit availability and risk 
diversification accessible to the business sector (see David et al., 200 and Levine and Zervos, 1996, 
for a review).  In addition, a measure of property rights protection is also included to reflect the 
importance this variable is believed to play in explaining the pace of innovation ((Yang and 
Maskus, 2001; Varsakelis; 2001; Lin et al., 2010). This is a composite index with values ranging 
from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates the highest degree of rule of law enforcement. The impact 
measured by this variable is not limited to that of property right security, but it encompasses a more 
composite dimension of fairness and effectiveness in justice administration. Finally, as a 
component of government expenditure appears in the model (public R&D) a measure of overall 
government’s deficit/surplus to GDP is also included. This is done in order to achieve a consistent 
specification of the public budget constraint (see Bose et al., 2007; Katsimi and Sarantides, 2012, 
                                            
5 The non-linearity hypothesis has appeared as an interesting one to test after visual inspection of the scatterplot of GDP 
per capita against BusinessR&D. In the plot, a positive relationship between overall level of development and business 
R&D sets in only after a certain income threshold. Such threshold corresponds to the level of income classified as ‘high’ 
by the World Bank’s Atlas classification (see Appendix A for a list of all high-income countries appearing in the sample). 
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for details). At the same time, though, this variable proxies for the quality of public account 
management. While, strictly speaking the latter is not a standard indicator of instability, it does 
provide a measure of fiscal reliability, and it has been used by other studies in the same way 
(Fisher, 1993; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Thus, its coefficient may partly capture the effect of 
more stable environments on private innovation. 
 
The third vector           
 
 is composed by the indicators of instability, which impact is the object of 
this analysis. The Polity IV ‘State Fragility Index’ is used as an indicator of political and 
institutional stability. The index rates countries according to the fragility of their effectiveness and 
legitimacy, in four performance dimensions: security, policy, economics, and social cohesion. A 
country’s fragility is measured by this Index as a state’s capacity to manage conflict, make and 
implement public policy, deliver essential services, maintain system cohesion and quality of life. 
Institutional uncertainty affects many elements of the macroeconomic business environment: via, 
for example, failing policy commitments; switching tax and incentive regimes; or revised economic 
targets and priorities (Fosu, 1992; Alesina et al., 1996). Thereby, institutional instability can bring 
about a more or less abrupt alteration in investment profitability expectations. Real, financial and 
monetary volatility is represented, respectively, by the coefficient of variation of (log) GDP per 
capita, stock market capitalisation, and real interest rate.
6
 Recurrent fluctuations in output proxy for 
the instability in the overall level of savings and aggregate demand; whereas variability in stock 
market capitalisation rates or in lending interest rates influence the cost of capital. In view of the 
long-term maturity horizon characterizing innovative investment and of its high-budget, risky 
nature; the present analysis seeks to test whether aggregate levels of private spending in R&D 
decline as a consequence of excessive variability in expected return rates resulting from 
fluctuations in any of the aforementioned dimensions.  
                                            
6 Technical details on the construction of the volatility indicators can be found in Appendix B.  
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The model is, first, estimated using a simple within-group estimator, which takes care of time-
invariant country specific fixed effects. Subsequently, to evaluate the model’s dynamics of 
adjustment and to address any potential simultaneity bias, the same estimation is applied to a 
specification where the lags of all endogenous variables are used instead of their levels. The 
application of standard within-group panel techniques is, however, not free of problems. It may, in 
fact, exacerbate measurement errors by removing a significant portion of the variation in the 
explanatory variables. In addition, it does not deal with cross-sectional dependence concerns. 
 
Following Pesaran (2004) and Baltagi (2005), if such cross-sectional dependence is caused by 
unobserved common factors which are uncorrelated with the included regressors the standard 
within-group estimator will still be consistent. However, if the unobserved factors are correlated 
with the included regressors, the within-group estimator will no longer provide unbiased and 
consistent results. A solution is the estimation of fixed-effect IVs, provided weak identification of 
the instruments is not an issue (De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). Therefore, a within-group Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) model is estimated last, with a varying set of instruments. First, 
internal instruments are used: in this case, first and second lags of all endogenous variables. 
Because private innovative investment is likely to exhibit lagged adjustment and response patterns 
to changes in the variables appearing on the RHS of the regression, the use of time-lagged internal 
instruments allows for the evaluation of such ‘adjustment dynamics’ effect. On the other hand, 
however, this is a second-best strategy, as ideally one would want to use excluded variables that are 
highly correlated with the endogenous controls but do not belong to the model specification. It is 
always difficult to find variables meeting such requirements in a macroeconomic analysis. A set of 
suitable external instruments is however selected and used next, to overcome the internal 
instruments concern.  
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3. RESULTS 
 
The benchmark regression in equation (1) is estimated in Table 1 in its basic, more parsimonious, 
form first. Subsequently, all volatility indicators are progressively included in columns (2)-(6). 
Columns (1)-(7) are within-group estimates, while column (8)-(10) are 2SLS-FE estimates. Huber-
White robust standard errors are reported for the whole estimation set.
7
  
 
The most basic regression specification in column (1) only includes (log) GDP per capita and its HI 
interaction, the lending interest rate, the stock market capitalization measure, public balance, trade 
openness and public R&D spending. Both GDP per capita and its interaction term are significant, 
albeit of opposite sign. This suggests the existence, in my sample, of a threshold level of GDP per 
capita after which Business R&D and the level of a development are positively related. Such 
threshold value of average national GDP per capita occurs, in my sample, at about $3000 per year.
8
 
The lending interest rate enters with a negative coefficient, as expected. The coefficient of stock 
market capitalisation indicates that more developed financial markets positively relate to the share 
of privately funded R&D. The latter result is in line with the findings of Levine and Zervos (1996) 
in that it enhances capital stock accumulation and its productivity. It is also in line with the finding 
of Greenwood and Smith (1997) according to which it facilitates technology-intensive investment 
by lowering the cost of mobilising savings. For the sample considered, all other covariates enter the 
basic within-group specification with coefficient insignificantly different from zero.  
                                            
7 Errors clustered at the country levels have also been used, with no significant difference in the results  
8 Note that the World Bank Atlas Classification System defines as lower middle income countries all countries in which 
average GNI per capita is comprised between the annual value of $1026-4035 
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Table 1. 
FE  2SLS-FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) 
            
LogGDPpc -0.262*** -0.261*** -0.231** -0.175* -0.321*** -0.246** -0.224**  -0.232** -0.423*** -0.226* 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.092) (0.098) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109)  (0.111) (0.144) (0.126) 
LogGDPpcHI 0.635*** 0.623*** 0.547*** 0.619*** 0.671*** 0.49*** 0.579***  0.56*** 0.616*** 0.532*** 
 (0.165) (0.166) (0.142) (0.193) (0.107) (0.103) (0.115)  (0.098) (0.119) (0.113) 
IntRate -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.004** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.002**  -0.001 -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
StockMK 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.152*** 0.124*** 0.133*** 0.144*** 0.12***  0.118*** 0.113*** 0.088*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036)  (0.034) (0.038) (0.029) 
Balance 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.006** 0.004  0.005* 0.010*** 0.005* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
PropertyRight 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.017*  0.013 0.007 0.019** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) 
GoverR&D 0.215 0.213 0.261 0.204 0.179 0.169 0.103  0.283 0.466*  0.159 
 (0.189) (0.190) (0.181) (0.222) (0.150) (0.139) (0.092)  (0.175) (0.246) (0.180) 
TradeOpen 0.057 0.059 0.086 0.018 0.029 0.092 0.035  0.059 0.143 0.030 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.065) (0.079) (0.075) (0.065)  (0.096) (0.166) (0.098) 
StockMKCoV  -0.080*    -0.040 -0.037  -0.011 -0.011 -0.026 
  (0.048)    (0.055) (0.054)  (0.041) (0.050) (0.046) 
LogGDPCoV   -0.133**   -0.205*** -0.111**  -0.14*** -0.226*** -0.142*** 
   (0.054)   (0.046) (0.044)  (0.037) (0.055) (0.040) 
IntRateCoV    -0.005**  -0.009*** -0.009**  -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
    (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
StateFragility     -0.020** -0.022** -0.016*  -0.017* -0.028** -0.023** 
     (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
Obs. 398 396 393 343 340 338 294  295 305 284 
R2 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.98 0.99 0.99  0.41 0.4 0.38 
N. country 
Wald F 
Hansen J 
59 
. 
. 
59 
. 
. 
59 
. 
. 
58 
. 
. 
57 
. 
. 
57 
. 
. 
52 
. 
. 
 46 
2.8 
. 
50 
3 
. 
44 
10 
0.13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. N.B.: Column (1)-(7) reports simple within-estimator results. In (7,) all endogenous regressors are 
lagged. Column (8)-(10) report the 2SLS-FE results. In (8) and (9) respectively, only the first lag and second lag of the endogenous variables is used. In (10,) both first and 
second lags are combined in the set of internal instruments. 
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Successively, moving from left to right in columns (2)-(5), the instability measures are added, one 
at a time and each one separately, and, all enter the regression with a negative sign. This indicates 
that excessive fluctuations in stock market capitalization rates, in aggregate output, in lending real 
interest rates and in the political environment all negatively affect private innovative investment.
 
As argued above, such instability is likely to produce a change in firms’ incentives and a revision 
of expected return rates.
 
These findings are in line with those of Barro (1991), Alesina et al. (1996), 
Fosu (2003) and confirmed by the previously cited microeconometric body of evidence 
surrounding the impact of volatility on R&D investment (Rafferty, 2003; Aghion et al., 2008; 
Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009). In column (6), all volatility measures are 
included in the benchmark specification at the same time. Two relevant changes take place with 
respect to the previous set of regressions: the change in significance of government balance now 
indicates that improved fiscal performance is positively related to private innovation spending. In 
addition, the impact of financial volatility is no longer significant when the other measures of real, 
monetary and political instability are included in the regression at the same time. This may indicate 
that when financial volatility appeared on its own its positive coefficient might have been capturing 
the effect of the other three components of aggregate volatility. 
 
One possible drawback of the results presented thus far is that they may be biased by reverse 
causation between the dependent variable and the endogenous covariates. To address the source of 
this simultaneity bias, the specification in column (6) is improved upon in column (7), where all 
endogenous variables are replaced by their first lag. While all results are substantially very similar 
to the ones previously presented, something to note is the fact that the measure of property rights 
protection now enters the model with a positive sign, indicating that in this sample improved rule 
of law enforcement leads to higher aggregate innovation spending. The result is in line with Yang 
and Maskus (2001), Varsakelis (2001) and Lin et al. (2010). It should not, however, be seen as a 
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contradiction of the argument that strict IPRs protection might slow the pace of innovation 
(Helpmann, 1993; Higino Schneider, 2005), because  the index of property rights protection used 
here proxies for a broader spectrum of rule of law enforcement dimensions, such as judiciary 
fairness and effectiveness. 
 
A further concern, as anticipated above, is that related to the potential presence of cross-sectional 
dependence. To address that, as well as to improve upon the treatment of endogeneity in the model, 
in a within-group 2SLS model is estimated in columns (8)-(10). In column (8), only the first lag is 
used in the internal instrument set, and in column (9) only the second lag. Both the interest rate and 
the index of property right protection lose significance in (8), while government balance gains it. 
All other results carry over from (7). In column (9), again the core results regarding the instability 
measures only slightly vary in magnitude. The interest rate is once again significant, as is 
government R&D expenditure albeit only at the 10% level.
9
 Neither the results of (8) nor those of 
(9) can, however, be trusted as the Kleibergen-Paap F statistics is considerably below 10, indicating 
that the identification of these models is weak. A Hansen J statistics for the overidentification test 
is not reported for either because the equations are exactly identified.  
 
To improve upon such shortcomings, in column (10) both sets of lags are combined in the 
instrumentation strategy.
10
 Once again, results carry over from previous specifications in that the 
impact of the level of development is overall positive, but the result is driven, in this sample, by 
middle to high income countries only. In fact, low income levels appear to be marginally 
                                            
9 Note that, due to the structure of the dataset, using the second rather than the first lag to instrument the endogenous 
variable results in a higher number of observations. This is due to the fact that some countries only provide innovation 
spending data, every two years 
10 These results appear in bold in the table to indicate that (10) is the preferred benchmark specification. 
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detrimental to private innovative investment. As expected, higher interest rate levels discourage 
Business R&D in this sample, while more developed stock markets encourage it. Improved fiscal 
performance is positively related to private R&D spending, and so is improved property rights 
protection. Neither public R&D spending nor trade openness have an impact which is significantly 
different from zero (see David et al., 2000 and Varsakelis, 2001 for similar evidence). With regards 
to the volatility measures, the coefficient of variation of stock market capitalization once again is 
not significant when other instability measures are included at the same time. Because this variable 
has never entered the regression with a non-zero impact, except when estimated on its own, it will 
dropped from all subsequent robustness tests. Real, monetary and political instability confirm their 
negative relationship with aggregate private R&D investment.  
 
These results are qualitatively similar to the ones attained by the previously cited microeconometric 
literature (Rafferty, 2003; Aghion et al., 2008; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 
2009) with respects to the impacts of real and monetary volatility. In this literature, aggregate 
demand volatility is proxied by sales, while monetary volatility is proxied by firms’ financial 
constraints. The qualitative impact estimated is, however, broadly comparable. Similarly, with 
respects to the institutional dimension, my results are in line with Barro (1991), Alesina et al. 
(1996), Fosu (2003), and Rodrik (1989). In particular, Rodrik shows that investors’ expectations 
are based on the subjective probability attached to policy reversal and on the magnitude of 
investment irreversibility.
11
 It follows that when both are high, aggregate private R&D declines.  
 
In order to provide a quantitative interpretation of the coefficient magnitude for the instability 
indicators, it may be useful to refer to the summary statistics table (below). The real volatility 
                                            
11 Goel and Ram (1999) show that, due of its high irreversibility, the impact of uncertainty is larger on R&D investment. 
Such high irreversibility is due to the large R&D investment shares going into project-specific personnel and equipment. 
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coefficient reported in column (10) of Table 1, can be interpreted in percentage change terms (see 
Appendix B for details). It indicates that, in this sample, a 1% increase in the coefficient of 
variation of (log) GDP per capita, leads to a 0.142% point decrease in private R&D spending. If we 
evaluate this impact at the mean value of the Business R&D to GDP ratio, it is immediately evident 
that this is a rather sizable impact. In fact, Table 2 shows that the average share of Business R&D 
to GDP in this sample is of around 0.71%.  
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
VARIABLE MEAN ST. DEV. MIN MAX 
BusinessR&D 0.709 0.714 0.0007 3.402 
GoverR&D 0.465 0.238 0.02 1.054 
LogGDPpc 9.016 1.109 5.645 10.55 
LogGDPpcHI 9.562 0.662 7.973 10.55 
IntRate 6.082 6.433 0 43.8 
StockMK 0.624 0.58 0.006 3.084 
PropertyRight 6.79 1.565 1.599 10 
Balance -1.34 3.101 -12.67 11.37 
TradeOpen 0.97 0.626 0.234 4.381 
StateFragility 3.214 4.058 0 16 
LogGDPCoV 0.324 0.241 0.009 1.271 
IntRateCoV 0.531 1.148 0.0005 11.74 
StockMKCoV 0.14 0.12 0.0007 0.813 
ExchRate 189.7 746.3 0.298 9170 
ExchRateCoV 0.082 0.186 0 1.38 
LogGDPStDev 
IntRateStDev 
PolConstraint 
0.029 
2.689 
0.447 
0.019 
4.014 
0.142 
0.0009 
0.374 
0 
0.094 
41.84 
0.718 
Democracy 
HtExp 
TaxRevenue 
FinancialDev 
FinancialDevCoV 
8.641 
16.61 
18.07 
0.929 
0.345 
3.116 
14.7 
6.033 
0.381 
0.386 
-7 
0.513 
0.957 
0.229 
0 
10 
73.59 
33.19 
2.024 
0.266 
 
 
Moving to the impact of monetary volatility: in this sample, a one standard deviation increase in 
the coefficient of variation of the interest rate results in 0.01% point decrease in privùate R&D. 
Considering that the minimum sample value of Business R&D as a share of GDP is equal to 
0.0007%, the impact of monetary volatility is again not trivial. Finally, a 1 point increase in the 
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‘State Fragility’ Index (which ranges from 0 to 25) leads to a 0.023% point decrease in aggregate 
Business R&D spending. The instrumentation validity for the benchmark specification is confirmed 
by the F and Hansen J statistics of (10), which indicate that the regression is correctly identified.  
 
5. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
In the following section, I investigate the robustness of the findings reported so far, by re-
estimating the benchmark regression under various modifications. These include alternative 
instrumentation sets, inclusion of time effects, alternative measurements of instability, variations in 
the regression specification and inclusion of non-linear effects. It will be shown, however, that the 
basic findings are not affected by such robustness tests. 
 
To start with, Column (1) of Table 3 repeats the benchmark specification to facilitate comparison. 
In column (2), external instruments are substituted to the internal ones used. This is done in an 
attempt to improve on the instrumentation strategy, by excluding lags of the endogenous RHS 
variable, which may belong to the model specification themselves if Business R&D exhibits 
persistence. Recall that the endogenous variables are (log)GDP per capita and its interaction term, 
government R&D expenditure and trade openness. The external instruments used are the infant 
mortality rate, the adjusted life expectancy, the total tax revenue (% GDP),
12
 and a trade openness 
indicator, calculated as the regional aggregate average of the original trade openness measure. The 
core results are not altered, though nearly all coefficient magnitudes increase. Moreover, while rule 
of law loses significance, trade openness now enters with a positive and significant coefficient. 
Nonetheless, these results cannot be trusted as both the F and Hansen-J statistics indicate that weak 
identification is a problem and that the exclusion restrictions are not met, though only marginally. 
                                            
12 Tax Revenue will also be included directly into the model in (9), where it enters with an insignificant coefficient. 
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Table 3 
 
   
                                                     2SLS-FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
LogGDPpc -0.226* -0.983*** -0.359** -0.42*** -0.243 -0.407*** -0.24** -0.247** -0.354** 0.635*** 
 (0.126) (0.332) (0.179) (0.148) (0.290) (0.127) (0.111) (0.119) (0.152) (0.245) 
LogGDPpcHI 0.532*** 0.822*** 0.61*** 0.659*** 0.54*** 0.678*** 0.428*** 0.529*** 0.604***  
 (0.113) (0.238) (0.134) (0.133) (0.152) (0.108) (0.108) (0.112) (0.172)  
IntRate -0.004*** -0.002* -0.004*** -0.004** -0.003** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003* 0.011 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) 
StockMK 0.088*** 0.101** 0.09*** 0.098*** 0.092** 0.1*** 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.075**  
 (0.029) (0.043) (0.033) (0.031) (0.037) (0.03) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)  
Balance 0.005* 0.011** 0.009*** 0.006* 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.01 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
PropertyRight 0.019** 0.011 0.019** 0.023** 0.02** 0.012* 0.019* 0.018** 0.021* -0.028* 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.01) (0.007) (0.01) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) 
GoverR&D 0.159 0.271 0.121 0.143 0.162 0.218 -0.08 0.099 0.223 0.205 
 (0.180) (0.793) (0.155) (0.178) (0.178) (0.160) (0.141) (0.167) (0.204) (0.216) 
TradeOpen 0.030 0.928** 0.002 0.048 0.033 0.031 0.053 0.059 0.204 0.543* 
 (0.098) (0.4) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.104) (0.087) (0.096) (0.129) (0.286) 
StockMKCoV -0.026 -0.017 -0.057        
 (0.046) (0.065) (0.049)        
LogGDPCoV -0.142*** -0.289*** -0.125*** -0.28*** -0.121***  -0.126*** -0.139*** -0.157*** 0.091 
 (0.040) (0.08) (0.04) (0.108) (0.043)  (0.036) (0.044) (0.046) 0.11 
IntRateCoV -0.01*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.118** -0.01**  -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.143 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.052) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.103) 
StateFragility -0.023** -0.048** -0.026** -0.032*** -0.025** -0.02** -0.056*** -0.025*** -0.023**  
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.01) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011)  
LogGDPCoV_sq    0.173*       
    (0.100)       
IntRateCoV_sq    0.077*       
    (0.042)       
LogGDPCoV_nl     -0.157      
     (0.313)      
IntRateCoV_nl     0.001**      
     (0.00)      
StateFragility_nl     -0.00      
     (0.001)      
LogGDPStDev      -1.057**     
      (0.429)     
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IntRateStDev      -0.003**     
      (0.001)     
PolConstraint       -0.434***   1.75 
       (0.121)   (1.09) 
StateFrag*PolCon       0.061***    
       (0.019)    
ExchRate        -0.00   
        (0.00)   
ExchRateEMU        -0.039   
        (0.025)   
ExchRateCoV        -0.029   
        (0.085)   
ExchRateCovEMU        0.042   
        (0.092)   
Democracy         -0.003  
         (0.013)  
HTExp         -0.002  
         (0.004)  
TaxRevenue         0.009  
         (0.006)  
FinancialDev          0.145* 
(0.083) 
FinancialDevCoV          0.132 
(0.348) 
Obs. 284 341 284 259 278 252 275 284 268 248 
R2 0.38 0.15 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.4 0.22 
N. country 
Wald F 
Hansen J 
44 
10 
0.13 
47 
1.4 
0.08 
44 
11 
0.49 
44 
10.5 
0.35 
44 
8.6 
0.42 
44 
8.6 
0.16 
44 
10 
0.24 
44 
8.3 
0.17 
44 
4 
0.09 
16 
59.3 
0.12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. N.B.: Column (1) corresponds to the benchmark model reported in column (10) of Table 
2. In column (2) external instruments are used. In column  (3) time dummies are added to the specification in (1). Column (4) and (5) add non-linearities of the 
volatility measures. In column (6), new political instability measures are included. In column (7), the volatility measures expressed as coefficient of variation in 
(1) are substituted by standard deviation ones. In column (8), the exchange rate and its volatility are added to (1). In column (9), three more RHS variables are 
included in the specification modelled in (1). In column (10), the benchmark specification in (1) is estimated in an OECD country panel. 
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Weak identification is often a problem of external instruments in macroeconomic analysis. On the 
other hand, as mentioned above, using internal instruments is a second-best strategy if lags of the 
endogenous variables belong themselves to the model, which could be the case if for example the 
dependent variable exhibited persistence. However, firstly, the Hansen-J statistics in (1) indicates 
that the exclusion restrictions are valid when internal instruments are used. And secondly, because 
R&D investment is, often, a residual category of investment, its persistency and serial correlation 
may be less pronounced. Something which is confirmed in my sample by the inspection of the 
private R&D data series (see Figure 2 in Appendix B). For these reasons, in all subsequent 
robustness checks the internal instrument set specification will be used. 
 
Next, in column (3), time dummies are added to control for any time effects which may be 
common across countries. All results carry over with no significant variation and no time dummy 
coefficient is significant, thus the dummies will be dropped from any subsequent estimation.
13
 
 
I turn, now, to the analysis of potential non-linearities. The impact of volatility on investment has 
been suggested in the literature to exhibit threshold effects. Sarkar (2000), in particular, argued that 
a positive relationship occurs at low uncertainty levels, and that this switches to a negative 
relationship only when uncertainty rises beyond a critical threshold. To test this hypothesis, non-
linearity effects have been modeled into the benchmark specification with the inclusion of 
quadratic terms in column (4), and, in column (5), with the inclusion of interaction terms.
14
 In (4), 
quadratic terms for both real and monetary volatility are included, which indicate that as either 
                                            
13 The time dummies coefficients are not reported in the table for reasons of space but are available upon request. 
14 Note that the volatility of stock market capitalisation has been dropped in column (4) to (10), due to its insignificance 
throughout the estimation set of Table 2 and in (2) and (3) of Table 3. 
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volatility dimension increases, aggregate private R&D spending decreases at a decreasing rate.
15
 
Thus, unlike Sarkar, I find that the impact of volatility on business R&D is negative, albeit 
decreasingly so for higher values of volatility. The rest of the results in this regression carry over 
from previous specifications.  
 
In (5), another type of non-linearity is examined. Specifically, I test whether the impact of 
instability varies according to the phase of the business cycle. To do this, I create a measure of 
GDP deviation from its mean, 
16
 and interact it with each volatility indicator. The interaction terms 
will indicate whether any difference exists between the impact of volatility during a recession and 
its impact during an expansion. My results indicate that a discernible differential in impact only 
exists for the monetary volatility component. Specifically, as the phase of the cycle improves, 
volatility in the interest rate becomes less of a hindrance to private R&D spending. This result is 
line with the claim made by the body of microeconometric literature reported above that 
uncertainty has less of a negative effect when credit constraint are not as binding (Aghion and Saint 
Paul, 1998; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Aghion et al., 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009). If such 
‘credit constraint’ effect is the prevailing dynamic underlying different investment responses along 
the business cycle, then this may account for the failure to identify a similar impact in the case of 
real and political instability. Moreover, uncertainty in GDP per capita and state effectiveness levels 
is less observable than fluctuations in the official lending interest rate. For this reason, the 
aggregate spending adjustment to real or political instability may be not as correlated or 
synchronised to the phase of the cycle as it is the case of interest rate variations. No other change 
takes place with regards to all other results. 
                                            
15 Note that a quadratic term of the StateFragility index is not included due to the ordinal nature of this variable 
16 The mean of (log) GDP per capita is calculated across the entire 1994-2008 time window. For each country, this is 
then subtracted from each year’s realised (log) GDP per capita value 
21 
 
Next, in column (6) and (7), I test the robustness of the volatility impacts uncovered so far to 
variations in the way instability is measured, or variations in the channel through which the impact 
takes place. In particular, in column (6), I use the standard deviation of both (log) GDP per capita 
and interest rate instead of their coefficient of variation. A great part of the literature agrees on the 
coefficient of variation being a more robust indicator of volatility than the standard deviation. 
Mobarak (2005) and Klomp and de Haan (2009) argue that the latter is an absolute measure of 
variation and it is very sensitive to noise in the data. The normalisation involved in the coefficient 
of variation, instead, makes it a relative measure of variation. In this respect, Klomp and de Haan 
(2009) show that the coefficient of variation allows to appropriately control for co-movements of 
similar countries, due, for example, to the effect of common business cycle patterns. Nonetheless, 
some shortcomings still persist in this measure. For example, for mean values close to zero, the 
coefficient of variation will approach infinity and be sensitive to small changes in the mean.  
 
Therefore, the robustness of the findings based on the coefficient of variation measures will be 
tested against those obtained using the standard deviation. All basic results remain identical in (6). 
Real and monetary instability have the same qualitative impact, but the coefficient magnitudes need 
re-interpreting. In this sample, the coefficient of real volatility indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in (log) GDP per capita leads to a 1.057% point decrease in Business R&D. 
While a one standard deviation increase in the real interest rate generates a 0.003% point decrease. 
 
In column (7), I verify the robustness of the institutional instability indicator by adding a measure 
of political constraints and an interaction between state fragility and political constraints. This is 
done in order to test under what specific conditions institutional instability produces negative 
changes in the level of aggregate private innovation spending. In particular, Henisz (2002) has 
constructed and used the ‘Political Constraint’ variable to show that constraints on the ease of 
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policy shifts in any given country are conducive to infrastructural investment, and specifically to 
innovative investment. The index  scores  are  derived  from  a  simple  spatial  model  and  
theoretically range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more political constraint and thus less 
feasibility of policy change. The idea is that, when any political actor can easily influence policy 
change, the resulting institutional framework will be more unstable. The political constraint 
measure is included in the model together with StateFragility and an interaction between the two.  
 
The impact of state fragility remains negative; however its magnitude has now increased. Unlike 
Henisz (2002), higher political constraints appear to hinder private R&D spending in this sample. 
This seemingly contradictory result can however be reconciled if one considers that a slow pace of 
policy change is negatively correlated to innovation when the former proxies for a conservative 
societal structure, or a malfunctioning National System of Innovation (see Lundvall, 1992, for more 
details on this point in the context of the National Innovation System literature). On the other hand, 
however, the interaction term between institutional instability and the political constraints index 
has a positive sign. This indicates that, given a negative impact of state fragility on business 
innovation, increased political constraints mitigate such negative impact, by limiting the extent to 
which instability can produce abrupt policy shift.  
 
Column (8) and (9) carry out some further robustness checks, via the inclusion of additional right 
hand side variables. As pointed out by Serven (2003), fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate can 
affect the export/import incentives of firms. In column (8), this international dimension is brought 
into the picture by adding the exchange rate level among the explanatory variables. At the same 
time, the coefficient of variation of the official exchange rate is also included to control for the 
effect of recurrent fluctuations in its level. Two additional terms are also constructed, by interacting 
a dummy variable (EMU), with both the exchange rate level and its volatility. EMU takes the value 
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of 1 for those countries which joined the European Monetary Union (EMU), and only in the year 
they switched currency regime. When the exchange rate is interacted with EMU, the interaction 
term controls for the structural break taking place when the euro currency regime is adopted, by 
correcting for the switch in measurement units.
17
 Instead, the interaction term between the volatility 
of the exchange rate and EMU is used to capture the increased exchange rate stability which 
followed the adoption of the common currency by the Euro Zone economies. While all previous 
results remain identical, none of the four variables introduced to model the international dimension 
enters the regression significantl. While this result contradicts Serven (2003), it is not an 
uncommon finding in the literature. In fact, the evidence on the relationship between exchange rate 
regimes and firms’ exports is rather inconclusive (see Wang and Barrett, 2007, for a review).  
 
Moving now to column (9) of Table 3, I present the set of results deriving from the inclusion of a 
number of additional regressors. Democracy takes values from 10 (very democratic countries) to 0 
(autocratic regimes). HTExp refers to the amount of high-tech exports to GDP and it has been 
instrumented with its first and second lag to account for its likely endogeneity. TaxRevenue refers 
to the level of overall fiscal imposition to GDP. None of these variables enters the regression 
significantly, but once again, neither the significance nor the qualitative impact of all other 
variables has been altered by the inclusion of these new covariates. Note, however, that both the F-
stat and the Hansen-J statistic deteriorate sharply in this specification. Such change is attributable 
to the inclusion of HTExp among the endogenous variables and of its lags in the instrumentation 
set, which has weakened the identification strategy. 
 
                                            
17 Most EMU countries in my sample joined the currency union in 1999; the rest between 2001 and 2007. When the 
switch takes place, LCU denominated exchange rates turn to euro denominations. The EMU dummy takes into account 
the break to avoid biasing the estimation. 
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In the last robustness test of column (10), I restrict the estimation sample to OECD countries only. 
This is done, first of all, because instability levels can be expected to be lower in these countries 
during the time span considered. At the same, a larger proportion of firms in high-income countries 
is likely to exhibit lower financial constraints and to have access to better developed financial 
markets. The combination of all such factors may result in an improved ability of the private sector 
to cope with volatility. 
18
 Thanks to the wider data coverage, the reduced panel is formed by fewer 
countries (17) but it covers a longer time period of 28 years, from 1981 to 2008, with a total sample 
size of 246 observations.  
 
The results shown in column (10) lend some support to the hypothesis mentioned above. In fact, in 
this sample, the evidence on the impact of real, monetary, political and financial instability is 
inconclusive.
19
 On the other hand, both the level of aggregate GDP per capita and the level of 
financial development are positive predictors of private R&D spending.
20
 In addition, trade 
openness also appears to have a positive impact on Business R&D in this sample, (significant at the 
10% level). This result is in line with the theoretical (Porter, 1990; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) 
and empirical findings (Smolny, 2003; Sameti et al., 2010; Wang, 2010) of a number of studies, 
which show how international openness is likely to result in a positive impact on technological 
progress, due to increased external exposure and interaction.  Finally, an interesting finding of this 
specification is the negative relationship linking Business R&D to the index of property rights 
protection. However, this result should not be seen as surprising, given that the protection standards 
                                            
18 Or even in its capacity to benefit from such fluctuations. As put forward by Schumpeter-inspired creative destruction 
theories (Hall, 1991; Saint-Paul, 1993). 
19 Note that the ‘StateFragility’ measure could not be used in this sample due to its time coverage (earliest data period is 
1994). Therefore Henisz’s Political Constraint Index is used instead 
20 Note that, in this sample, due to the data availability restrictions for the 1980s, stock market capitalisation has been 
substituted by a measure of private credit by commercial banks as a proxy for financial development 
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of both physical and intellectual property rights enforced in this sample of OECD economies is 
already very high. The result may rather indicate that there exists a certain threshold past which 
stricter enforcement levels can prove detrimental to innovation incentives and diffusion. Such 
argument is supported by various theoretical and empirical studies (Furukawa, 2007; Murray and 
Stern, 2007; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Gangopadhyaya and Mondal, 2012), which show that the 
relationship between property rights protection and innovation exhibits an inverted-U pattern, in 
which too weak or too high enforcement levels are detrimental to the pace of innovation. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has studied the impact of macro-institutional instability on private innovative 
investment. The underlying motivation for investigating such relationship lies in the consideration 
that innovation is crucial to growth and development. Yet, its long maturity horizon coupled with 
its high-budget nature make it an intrinsically riskier type of investment. The empirical analysis has 
therefore sought to clarify the relationship between various dimensions of volatility and aggregate 
private R&D spending in unstable macro-institutional environments.  
 
The contribution of the paper has been threefold. Firstly, the literature on the impact of instability 
on private R&D spending focuses mainly on first moment effects, by relating recessions to 
innovation incentives. Such focus has been here expanded to cover second moment fluctuations, 
that is, it has been extended to the role of overall volatility. Secondly, a macroeconometric 
approach has been adopted to complement the firm-based evidence already available in the 
literature. While such approach has its limitation, it has helped uncover the aggregate dynamics 
underlying movements in national levels of private R&D investment in unstable environments. 
Finally, the analysis has disentangled the specific impact of a number of co-existing instability 
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dimensions. In particular, the econometric findings suggested three channels through which macro-
institutional volatility negatively affects business R&D investment, that is, political, real and 
monetary volatility. Such impact has been shown to exhibit non-linearities and to be larger for 
higher values of the real and monetary volatility dimensions. In addition, the negative effect of 
monetary instability appears to be mitigated during expansionary phases of the cycle, in the sample 
considered. Finally, the evidence on financial and international volatility is inconclusive. 
 
The indirect policy implication deriving from the results here presented points towards the 
desirability of safeguarding stable macroeconomic and institutional environments if encouraging 
private innovation engagement is a priority. Considerations regarding the most appropriate policy 
tools are beyond the scope of this paper. However, an interesting avenue for further research seems 
to be the investigation of the role that targeted counter-cyclical policy interventions may play in 
preserving private profitability horizons and incentives. 
 
 
APPENDIX A: DATA AND COUNTRY APPENDIX 
 
 
TABLE A1. COUNTRY LIST 
Argentina Cyprus* Ireland*† Mongolia Slovak Rep* 
Australia† Czech Rep* Israel*† Netherlands*† Slovenia* 
Austria*† Denmark*† Italy*† Norway† South Africa 
Belgium*† Estonia* Japan† Panama Spain** 
Bolivia Finland *† Korea Rep*† Paraguay Thailand 
Brazil France** Kuwait Philippines Uganda 
Bulgaria Germany*† Latvia* Poland* Ukraine 
Canada*† Hungary* Lithuania Portugal*† United Kingdom*† 
Chile Iceland*† Malaysia Romania United States*† 
China India Malta* Russia Uruguay 
Colombia Iran Mexico Singapore* Venezuela 
*High-Income countries (ATLAS classification) *†OECD countries included in the robustness analysis 
panel †OECD countries appearing in the robustness analysis panel only 
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TABLE A2. DATA SOURCES 
BUSINESSR&D R&D spending by the private sector (%GDP) 
OECD-MSTI Database  
UNESCO - Stats.uis  
RICYT.org 
GOVERR&D  R&D spending by the public sector (%GDP) 
  
OECD-MSTI Database  
UNESCO - Stats.uis 
RICYT.org 
LOGGDPPC Log(Total Output / Population) World Bank-WDI  
INTRATE 
Real interest rate based on lending rate charged to 
businesses by commercial banks (3 months-1 year) 
Own calculation. Raw data from World 
Bank-WDI 
BALANCE Overall Deficit/Surlpus (%GDP) 
 
IMF -Government Finance Statistics 
 
PROPERTYRIGHT  
0-10 Index where 10 indicates the highest level of 
rule of  law enforcement  
Economic Freedom of the  World – Area 2: 
Legal System and Property Rights 
 
TRADE OPENNESS  (Exports + Imports) / GDP  World Bank-WDI  
STOCKMK 
 
Value of listed shares to GDP, calculated using the 
deflation:{(0.5)*[Ft/Pet+Ft-1/Pet-1]}/(GDPt/Pat), 
where F is stock market capitalization, Pe is end-of 
period CPI, and Pa is average annual CPI 
Database on Financial Development and 
Structure (Beck et al. 2009) 
STATEFRAGILITY  
 
The Index scores countries on effectiveness and 
legitimacy in four dimensions: security, political, 
economic, and social. Scores are 0-25 where 0 
indicates very stable countries 
 
POLITY IV Dataset  
 
POLCONSTRAINT 
 
The index measures the feasibility of policy change 
It ranges from 0-1, with higher scores indicating 
more political constraint 
 
Henisz’ Political Constraints Index III 
Dataset 
EXCHRATE Nominal Exchange Rate (LCU per US$) 
 
World Bank-WDI  
IMF–International Financial Statistics 
DEMOCRACY 
The index ranges from -10 to 10, where -10  
is the score given to authoritarian regimes  
 
POLITY IV Dataset  
HTEXPORTS High-Tech Exports/ Tot Manufacturing Exp World Bank-WDI  
 
TAXREVENUE 
 
Tot Tax Revenue / GDP 
 
IMF- Governance Finance Statistics  
 
 
 
FINANCIALDEV 
 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP, calculated using the 
deflation:{(0.5)*[Ft/Pet+Ft-1/Pet-1]}/(GDPt/Pat) where 
F is stock market capitalization, Pe is end-of period 
CPI, and Pa is average annual CPI 
 
Database on Financial Development and 
Structure (Beck et al. 2009) 
 
INFANT MORTALITY  
 
Infant Mortality Rate per 1000 live births 
 
World Bank - WDI  
 
LIFE EXPECTANCY 
 
Adjusted Life Expectancy at birth 
 
World Bank - WDI 
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APPENDIX B: TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
 
The Coefficient of Variation is a normalized measure of dispersion of a variable’s distribution over 
a certain time period. It is calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of a series. 
 
 ( )                 (   ⁄  ) 
 
where the standard deviation is calculated as follows 
 
( )                     √
 
   
∑ (    ̅) 
 
                                                   
 
 In this paper, a two year rolling window is utilised to calculate both mean and standard deviation 
of (logged) GDP per capita, real interest rate and stock market capitalisation. Thus real, monetary 
and financial volatility, in this context, is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean 
of the rolling window. A backward looking strategy has been used in constructing such window, to 
reflect the type of knowledge agents might have of volatility at time t. The latter is typically 
attained by comparing the volatility levels prevailed at time t-1 with those of time t. For example,  
to obtain the real volatility of the year 2001, the standard deviation and mean of (log) GDP per 
capita are first calculated over the 2000-2001 period and then their ratio is multiplied by 100. 
Likewise, to obtain the coefficient of variation of GDP per capita in 2002, values from the years 
2001 and 2002 are used to calculate both standard deviation and mean. Please note that, because of 
the log transformation with which GDP per capita appears in the regressions, the coefficient 
magnitude of real volatility is not comparable to that of the other volatility measures. To restore 
visual comparability, the coefficient of variation of GDP per capita has been multiplied by 100. Its 
quantitative interpretation will however also be in percentage change terms. 
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FIG.2 CORRELOGRAM OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE (BUSINESS R&D) 
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